This paper compares the organisation of sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo during UN operations to the sexual violence associated with US military bases in the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the 1970s, while also drawing some comparisons with the way sexual violence was organised in wartime Yugoslavia. I argue that in all of these cases military men agree that soldiers are entitled to heterosexual encounters, and thus provide women for soldiers to have sex with, treating the women concerned as people whose well-being, dignity and bodily integrity is of no relevance at all. Such sexual violence appears to be institutionalised across contemporary militaries. However, the political logic that categorises women as people to be protected or as people who have no rights to bodily integrity differs across sites. My enquiry is based in a sociology of the body that treats sexual violence as political violence, thus I expect that the sexual categorisation and organisation of women for soldiers will reveal important aspects of the political order the militaries involved are defending. I will elaborate on this theoretical perspective in relation to the three cases in the course of my discussion. Through comparing these three military contexts I seek to understand how military thinkers in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo divided people in relation to physical security and rights to bodily integrity, and thus to uncover the logic of the political order these peacekeeping operations defended.

Sexual Violence as a Political Technology

Much of the documentation that many women are being repeatedly raped, and held against their will in the sex industry in Bosnia and Kosovo comes from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) which runs shelters and a program for reintegrating trafficked women; as part of this they conduct interviews with women who have escaped and publish regular reports. Further evidence comes from a hearing before a sub-committee of the US House of Representatives about the involvement of US personnel in trafficking where various people close to the situation gave evidence. UNICEF has also published a detailed research report collecting together empirical evidence. There is also some investigative journalistic evidence from the BBC and other sources. These sources tell remarkably similar stories: women in prostitution in Bosnia and Kosovo during the UN mandate came from poor countries and were tricked by traffickers who agreed to help them get across borders and find work in western Europe, although some were kidnapped. All report being sold, most more than once, after leaving their home countries for amounts between $US500 - $US2500. If they had passports or other documents these were taken away and they were held prisoner, constantly supervised or locked in rooms, and forced to work without pay in brothels with no control over their working conditions. Women report being, beaten, sexually humiliated, raped, and threatened not to escape or risk being caught by the traffickers and subjected to more violence, or by the police and raped and re-sold, or imprisoned for prostitution and illegal migration. Sometimes they were drugged, especially while travelling. They were not
fed well, when they ate, what they wore and when and how they attended to their basic bodily needs was controlled.

While these conditions sounds extreme they are typical of the experience of women who have escaped to IOM shelters. Of course such women may not be typical of all prostitutes in these territories, but the most obvious difference is that women who go to a shelter, or escape by another route, have had to mobilise a great deal of psychological energy and also have to be prepared to return to their home countries. Since all women who have escaped report seeing other women abused and mistreated in the brothels it seems safe to assume that the conditions women in the IOM shelters report are experienced by many more women than those who have managed to escape. These reports provide the empirical basis for my characterisation of the organisation of prostitution in Bosnia and Kosovo as organised sexual violence against women and girls.

This situation is not new in the sense that it is typical of sites associated with concentrations of soldiers, through comparing what happened in Bosnia and Kosovo with peacetime military bases in ROK we can understand more about the social and cultural reasons that organised sexual abuse of women and girls was a characteristic of ‘peacekeeping’. Katharine Moon’s analysis of prostitution associated with US military bases in ROK reminds us that state policies toward sexual violence are not necessarily coherent and contain ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ aspects, both are important to explore as is this incoherence of policy and practise in relation to sexual violence in itself. Moon convincingly shows that regulation of prostitution was an aspect of ROK-US inter-state relations, although it was illegal in ROK and US command policies ‘say “no” to prostitution’. This tolerance and complicity on the part of both states was the case even though the women in prostitution associated with US bases told stories of coercion, violence and debt bondage (discussed further below) very similar to those told by the women who have escaped from brothels in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moon provides solid empirical evidence of the government of ROK and officials of the United States Forces in Korea being complicit in forcing women into prostitution to serve US soldiers. Her focus is on how global politics impacted on the everyday life of prostitutes in the ‘camptowns’ around US bases in ROK, and how their everyday life also impacted on international relations. Thus her analysis is rich in empirical detail that lends itself to further consideration of the way sexual violence is organised in a military context and is part of wider political relationships.

Interestingly, her research clearly shows that the US military and ROK government actors agreed that a sexual reward was due to the US soldiers, and were complicit in forcing women into prostitution to provide them with it. This sexual reward seems to have been a way to make military life seem attractive, the soldiers were offered an image of themselves as sexually powerful heroic figures, their sexual power confirmed by the sexual submission of beautiful women. The Korean prostitutes were schooled to behave in an obsequious way toward the soldiers. An ROK government official who visited the camptowns during the ‘cleanup’ campaign told Moon he exhorted Korean prostitutes to follow the example of Japanese prostitutes who were sold to US soldiers in the post-45 occupation:

The Japanese prostitute, when she finished with the GI, did not get up to go get the next GI (for more money) but knelt before him and pleaded with him to help rebuild Japan.

In 1977 Stars and Stripes (the main military newspaper) even made explicit the promise of adoring sexually submissive women as part of the parcel of military life in Korea:

Picture having three or four of the loveliest creatures God ever created hovering around you, singing, dancing, feeding you, washing what they feed you down with rice wine or beer, all saying at once, “You are the greatest.” This is the Orient you heard about and came to find.

In the 1970s at least, many officers in the US military considered prostitution an important factor in making soldiers feel good about being in Korea: army researchers into ‘human
factors’ described prostitution as the core of ‘troop-community relations’. Perhaps a certain ambivalence in living out these policy decisions can be detected in a practice reported by a Korean official who worked in ROK-USFK community relations: ‘The US GIs didn’t like being in Korea. If you walked into their billets [barracks], you would see posters of women’s bodies marked up and divided into 365 days.’ However this practice also shows something about what soldiers expected from their time in ROK.

Offering soldiers a fantasy of manly power and female sexual subservience as compensation for the hardships of military life is a practice defended by military men who fear the impact of ‘feminisation’. In his 1989 book *Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military* Brian Mitchel, a former army officer, argues passionately against the increasing part played by women in US military forces. He argues that: ‘Young men can be persuaded to endure years of dirt, danger and drudgery in occupations whose only attraction is their manly character. … [m]ilitary service has always been considered the most manly of roles’ He makes the case that the military establishment as a whole should be a strict hierarchy of heterosexual males; aggressive masculinity, he argues, is essential to the military, which is after all about violence and killing.

The sharp gender binary, which Mitchell argues is essential to attracting men to the military creates cohesion across the centralised hierarchy necessary to military organisation. While accepting the individual subordination required by military units, soldiers are also constructed as powerful men: military culture underlines masculine power through emphasis on men’s superiority to and control over the feminine. The existence of this sharp gender binary is clear from reflections by and about soldiers from a variety of contexts, for example ‘Hans’ reflects on his time in the South African Defence Force: ‘the fit virile male is the archetype in the army, who can take punishment and keep going … [w]omen are definitely considered one of the lowest forms of life in the army’. We can also see it in the way military actions and weapons are imagined in terms of phallic power, targets are feminised and penetrated, for example ‘bend over Saddam’ was reportedly written on US missiles targeted on Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, while ‘High-Jack [sic] this Fags’ was written on a missile targeted on Afghanistan in 2001.

‘The presence of women inhibits male bonding, corrupts allegiance to the hierarchy, and diminishes the desire of men to compete for anything but the attentions of women’ argues Mitchell. There have been too few mixed gender combat units to empirically test this theory, but Mitchell does accurately describe the significance of sexual culture to contemporary militaries. Setting men apart from and above women by virtue of their shared masculinity requires the presence of an imagined feminine in relation to which the masculine can be constructed. Thus when Mitchell objects to ‘the presence of women’ of course he only means ‘women as soldiers’. To construct heterosexual masculine bonds the presence of women, as sexually subservient admirers, as vulnerable beings in need of protection, as conquered enemy territory, remains necessary.

The concept of ‘hyper-masculinity’ is useful for analysing the discourses and practices that sustain this sharp gender binary in military organisations. Hyper-masculinity is an analytical term that refers to a set of practices and discourses, including excessive emphasis on male physical strength, belief in the legitimacy and appropriateness of male violence in certain situations, misogynist discourses and anti-homosexual discourses. Hyper-masculine speech and behaviour asserts a man’s entitlement as a man to particular privileges, which for the most part signify deference to his social authority. Some analyses have focused on hyper-masculine behaviour as a dangerous characteristic of low income men and men from racial or ethnic minorities, dwelling upon the physical power of these men and the sexual danger they represent, as in discourses about the black male rapist discussed in various literatures. Others interpret hyper-masculine behaviour as a form of resistance to racial, ethnic and/or class oppression: The theory here is that men, when denied institutional and economic power, assert physical power and displays of aggression as the main markers of manhood. However misogynist posturing and sexual aggression do not only characterise black men, working class men or men from any particular ethnic category since these behaviours are also found among, for example, college fraternity men and military men.
Hyper-masculine behaviour can be understood as political insofar as it sustains hierarchical
gender relations across various social settings; in this sense, sexual violence, as a form of
hyper-masculine behaviour, is also a form of political violence.

To understand how sexual violence works to materialise political power we need a
sociological understanding of both the body and the subject. In my view Anne Cahill has
moved social theory a step forward in social theories about sexual violence since her work
brings together recent developments in philosophical theories of embodiment and sociological
and psychological studies of sexual violence.22 Cahill’s work shows that the power of rape
can best be understood through a concept of human beings as both inter-subjective and
embodied. Thus, what makes an act ‘sex’ or ‘violence’ is dependent on the character of the
inter-subjective relation of the bodies involved; all kinds of activity can be sexualised or
turned into a form of violence. Violence is rarely ‘meaningless’, as we so often feel when
confronted with it: it is loaded with meaning and manifests social hierarchies, power and
powerlessness. Bodily acts are part of the language of social relationships: hand-shaking,
kissing, bowing, punching or penetrating materialise our relation to one another as subjects
relating to one another within a social hierarchy.

Political violence is category producing: violent acts are a powerful technique for
categorising people as enemies or as subordinates, or for controlling and/or excluding
categories of people. The violence enacts and thus materialises the relation of subordination,
ennemy, and so forth. Specific kinds of bodily acts are common to category-making political
violence on the bodies of those who are being categorically excluded from regular norms of
social interaction, for example in political torture, in the practise of lynching in the Southern
States of the US, or in hate crimes against homosexuals. Typical of such violence are:
abductions, beatings, whippings, burns, cuts, penetration of the mouth, anus, vagina by
objects or a penis, forced contact of the head with the ground and/or with foul substances
(urine, faeces, etc.), cutting off and keeping parts of the body as souvenirs.23 Such behaviours
are an enactment of the relation of the victim to the perpetrator, and of the political relation
between the category of people the perpetrator is from and that the victim is from. The
subordination and degradation of victim’s body stands in for a category of people who are
being subordinated and degraded.

Violent bodily acts thus not only represent social relations they manifest them, and in so
doing they act on subjectivity, that is they construct (or attempt to) subordinated subjects.
This operation of power depends upon our inter-subjectivity, that is, the way our self-
understandings form in relation to recognition by others. The source of the inter-subjective
character of our subjectivity is our desire for recognition by others: We are vulnerable to the
definitions of others because we cannot exist as social beings without recognition, thus our
subjectivity forms in relation to what others communicate to us about ourselves. This insight
is important for understanding the power of sexually violent acts as defining (or categorising)
acts of subordination. Sexualised zones of the body are inevitably reserved for specific kinds
of contact with specific people according to a culture’s codes. Sexual violence most often
involves display and contact with sexualised parts of the body, and sometimes, but not
always, the infliction of pain/injury on these parts. However, sexual violence does not need to
involve physical pain or injury since forcing contact with and exposure of sexual parts of the
body is enough to establish the victim’s powerlessness in relation to the perpetrator. This is
also true of some other forms of political violence, for example forced contact with excrement
may not cause much bodily harm but underlines the perpetrator’s power in relation to the
victim. Of course the rationality behind the infliction of pain and injury is also the
construction of the power of the perpetrator and their control over the victim’s body. The
impact of sexual violation and other forms of torture on subjects is remarkably similar in
different cultural contexts and across genders: Over-riding reactions are a sense of
humiliation, powerlessness and social alienation, while some impacts are more culturally or
gender specific, and others are unique to the individual insofar as the experience becomes part
of their personal narrative and impacts on her/his relations with others. Thus every act of
violence has a unique meaning for the person violated, yet the overwhelming commonality of
the reactions of humiliation, feelings of powerlessness and social alienation tell us something
about the power of degrading violence in constructing subordinated subjects.\textsuperscript{24} Of course subjects resist such acts of power, but the strength required to do so also testifies to the power of this kind of violence.

Sexual violence, then, is a political technology that materialises power and powerlessness and thus constructs hierarchical relations based on categories of powerful and subordinate bodies. Attention to the structural context and systems of cultural meanings where sexual violence is prevalent is important for understanding how such acts work within, are produced by and reproduce specific social/cultural systems and enact political relationships. For example, in the case of ROK we will see that the ‘right’ of the US soldiers to sex with Korean women overrode any ‘rights’ these women had, including their right to bodily integrity. Moon argues that this fitted US racial ideologies regarding Asian women, also seen, she adds, on T-shirts on sale for US soldiers in Japan and the Philippines with pictures of women and the slogans LBSM ‘little brown sex machine’ or ‘Little Brown Fucking Machines Powered with Rice’.\textsuperscript{25}

Doubtless many soldiers smiled at these slogans. Sex, and things associated with sex, can be a source of intense pleasure and this is important to understanding sexual violence: While feminists often assert that sexual violence is ‘about power not sex’ I think we cannot understand how it works politically while ignoring the fact that it is a form of sexual pleasure for the perpetrator. Furthermore we need to consider how sexual pleasure and discourses about sexual pleasure operates to support sex industries around military bases. Military planners carefully regulate where soldiers obtain sexual pleasure,\textsuperscript{26} as evidenced by strict policies in relation to homosexuality and military family life. Homosexual relations are strictly taboo in modern militaries, although this was challenged in the US in the 1990s the resistance to the idea reveals just how culturally threatening allowing ‘gays in the military’ was and how important the regulation of soldiers’ sexuality is to military planners. At certain overseas bases militaries will pay for families of soldiers to accompany them, at such sites adulterous relations are a matter for military discipline, at other sites they will not allow families, thus the military adjusts its policies, both official and unofficial to different situations.\textsuperscript{27} For example, in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War ‘even before the soldier could go near a local woman and get caught by Arabs, we’d [US Military Authority] get him before the Arabs could’ according to an army chaplain, whereas in Vietnam, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines prostitution was not only tolerated but encouraged, in fact the ‘overwhelming cultural pressure’ on soldiers to participate was reportedly difficult to resist.\textsuperscript{28} The same army chaplain told Moon that in Korea the military ‘winks at what goes on’ (in relation to prostitution), while a sailor who served in the Philippines reported that when his ship arrived in Korea a medical officer ‘threw the men condoms as if they were Hallmark cards’.\textsuperscript{29} Discourses about the sexual pleasure the soldiers could take in prostitution obscured the violence associated with it from the women’s point of view. Such regulation of military sexuality is typical of modern militaries and not a particular characteristic of the US, before the US military presence in Korea the Japanese military had organised prostitution there, while in Vietnam the French military had.\textsuperscript{30} In wartime soldiers may be encouraged to rape, for example in Vietnam US soldiers report that they were encouraged to rape\textsuperscript{31} while it seems that all the militaries engaged in the conflicts in Yugoslavia encouraged soldiers to rape, as will be discussed further below.

Encouraging soldiers to rape is a technology that not only produces ‘manly bonds’ between soldiers, while setting boundaries between competing military organisations, it also produces soldiers as particular kinds of subjects. While there are continuities between wartime rapes and post-wartime prostitution (because so much of it is coerced) the differences are also important: the soldier who goes to a prostitute may be seeking an experience that simulates mutual ‘love-making’ (for example some Korean prostitutes told Moon that some GI’s were ‘gentle’) and may imagine that the prostitute enjoys it, or at least chose her occupation; the soldier who rapes is supposed to derive pleasure from the woman’s degradation. Citing a number of sources on torturers, Copelon comments that stories about how Bosnian Serb military men were incited to rape reflect ‘common methods of training torturers – exposure to and engagement in increasingly unthinkable violence and
humiliations. Enloe also suggests that inciting soldiers to rape could be a way to make killers out of unwilling recruits, this would fit both the Vietnam and the Bosnian cases as well as the cases of rapes by government soldiers in Guatemala and the contras in Nicaragua, which she discusses as both depending on ‘unwilling young men’ as recruits. Forcing men to commit atrocities isolates them from everyday civilian communal relations, forcing them to commit sexual atrocities links violence with sexual pleasure and thus may be a way to turn unwilling men into effective fighters. Copelon suggests that mass rape was also a way to quash the spirit of civilians, destroying communal bonds and thus attacking the very existence of the social collective.

Military Sexual violence Compared: Wartime Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Korea.

Having considered some of the reasons sexual violence flourishes around military bases we can ask how similar the situation in relation to sexual violence under UN ‘peacekeeping’ operations is to what we know about soldier behaviour at other sites? In Bosnia and in Kosovo there were some similarities to Moon’s description of the conditions of prostitution around the military bases in ROK. One similarity is the system of debt bondage and its relation to migration, the women in the Korean camptowns had been migrating seeking work and had been tricked or forced into working in camptown brothels, or they had chosen work in the brothel and become tied it by an endless debt. Nevertheless the women in the camptowns seemed to have a little more day to day freedom than the women in Bosnia and Kosovo: they had their own rooms and some at least raised their children. Moon speaks of the prostitutes having their own sub-culture, which also suggests some freedom of movement and association. Thus, while their movements were monitored to make sure they provided sex to the soldiers and did not run away, it appears that freedom of movement was possible within the neighbourhood of their brothel; after an initial period of intense violence and captivity some women seemed more held by fear of the consequences of defaulting on their debt and the lack of any place else to go. They got to keep about 20% of the money men paid for sex with them, from which they had to pay the costs of their room and furnishings, clothing and mandatory regular doctors fees (and the bribes doctors demanded), yet most were still able to send money home. There were official prostitutes’ organisations with leaderships selected by police and government officials who nevertheless played something of a role in defending prostitute interests. Moon reports on prostitutes being at the forefront of a series of political protests demanding US soldiers pay higher prices, these actions were supported by their pimps, however such protest activity became impossible after the extra controls introduced into camptown life as part of the ‘cleanup campaign’ initiated by the US military administration.

By contrast, control over prostitutes seems to have been much more intense in Bosnia and Kosovo: women report being held in rooms and their movements being tightly controlled, there would simply have been no opportunity to organise a political protest. The system of debt bondage seemed to work in Bosnia and Kosovo less to bind the women (who report being very closely monitored so that escape took some planning and luck) and more to simply motivate them to please brothel customers. They were told once they had paid back their ‘purchase price’ they would be able to leave, or to keep some of the money men paid for sex with them: 74% of the women in a Kosovo study were never paid anything at all, only 4% reported getting regular pay and 13% were paid either at first or towards the end of their time (the remainder said the question did not apply or they did not respond). Each woman’s ‘debt’, constantly increased, with petty fines being added for infractions of brothel rules along with the costs of her board, lingerie, food and so on. If her owner re-sold her then she had to begin the process of trying to pay back her purchase price all over again.

Moon does not report the existence of the kind of ‘markets’, which many women who have escaped brothels in Bosnia and Kosovo report, where women are paraded in front of buyers, nor does she report the frequent buying and selling of women that seemed to be
common in Bosnia and Kosovo. She does report soldiers paying a woman’s ‘club debt’ in order to free her from the brothel and set up house with her, forming such a relationship was in fact a goal of many of the women as a plausible way out of life in the brothel.\textsuperscript{41} How similar cases of peace-keeping personnel ‘buying’ women from brothels is to this practice in Korea would be interesting to know, there is evidence of women turning to brothel clients for help. In at least one case in Kosovo a UN police officer responded to a request for help by ‘buying’ the woman who he then left free to go home, which she did. Ironically, this man was the only person discharged for involvement in trafficking in a subsequent investigation into this woman’s evidence, something that caused her a great deal of distress since she felt entirely the wrong person had been punished for what happened to her.\textsuperscript{42} Her story supports the evidence of a cover-up of the situation with trafficking and the tokenistic ineffective nature of anti-trafficking programs, which will be discussed further below. At this point I simply note that buying and selling of women went on in both Bosnia, Kosovo and in ROK, and the foreign military men sometimes bought women, to keep, to marry, to free, or in some cases to re-sell. Nevertheless the market seemed to operate in a much more organised way with more frequent exchanges in Bosnia and Kosovo than in ROK.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, unlike in Korea, local women are not forced into working in the brothels used by the military men, comparison with the Korean example may illuminate the reasons for this. Moon shows that in ROK the government was anxious to keep the sex trade bordered off from their concept of Korean society, which they wanted US troops to defend. Thus, being constrained by the need for foreign soldiers for national defence the government devised a way to keep those soldiers away from the majority of ‘national women’. Special prostitution zones were created where women were to be available specifically for foreigners (40% of these zones were for tourists and 60% for US soldiers), thus keeping foreign sexuality away from most Korean women. Prostitution was formerly illegal, (although it was regulated, the laws simply contradict each other), nevertheless the government of ROK used it in order to build the economy and to smooth their relations with the US military.\textsuperscript{43} While prostitution is also formerly illegal in Bosnia and Kosovo, at these sites none of the government authorities seem concerned with containing or regulating the sex market, while some local police and government authorities are reportedly actively profiting from it.\textsuperscript{44} On the other hand the women being sold to the foreign military presence are not from the local population thus, because of the presence of these ‘illegal’ women, there is no need to make legal allowances for the sexuality of the foreign soldiers. Using local women perhaps would have caused unbearable political tension but using outside women seemed to be acceptable to the local politics of sexual violence.

Thus in order to understand how military sexual violence was organised during UN peacekeeping we need to give consideration to the significance of the politics of sexual violence in the Yugoslav wars. Darius Rejali interprets the rapes and the politics of rape discourse in the wars in Yugoslavia as a manifestation of the lack of clear hierarchical relations or symbolic markers (such as dress, language, physical characteristics and so forth) between groups of males that defined themselves as separate peoples with exclusive rights of sexual access to ‘their’ women. In this kind of conflict discourses about the danger of rape from the ‘other’ men served as one way to set clear boundaries between the groups, they operated as an ‘ethno-marker’. Rejali agrees with Silva Meznaric that in Kosovo in the early 1990s the discourse of ‘the Albanian male rapist’ was significant in dividing the society since much of the contact between the two groups was contact between Serbian women and Albanian men who worked together.\textsuperscript{45} But she also notes that soldiers from all of the groups in conflict raped ‘each others’ women’ and discourse about the danger of sexual violence from the ‘other’ men existed on all sides,\textsuperscript{46} thus she thinks the rapes were primarily about men communicating their rage at other men on the ‘battlefield’ of women’s bodies.\textsuperscript{47} Conflict over control over women’s bodies had been simmering in Yugoslavia for a long time, expressed in anxiety over fertility rates among the ‘others’, and also manifested in the practice of forced impregnation during the wars, as discussed by Vesna Nikolić–Ristanović in the same volume.\textsuperscript{48} Raping the ‘other’ women in front of the ‘other’ men was a way of demonstrating their utter defeat in their inability to provide protection. This seems to be one reason that war-
time rapes are often carried out in front of ‘enemy’ men: while Rejali reports such cases in the wars in Yugoslavia, Enloe reports similar behaviour among US soldiers in the case of US operations in Vietnam.49

These conflicts between competing military organisations of Yugoslav males over keeping clear boundaries around ‘their’ women are interesting to compare to the conflicts over women among US soldiers in ROK. Black US soldiers in the early 1970s were increasingly demanding equality within the army (and more broadly in the US of course) and challenging segregationist practices. Investigations into racism in the US army in both Vietnam and ROK confirm that white soldiers insisted on racially segregating the prostitutes, dividing them into ‘our’ and ‘their’ women. Of course the problem with this system was that ‘white’ prostitutes (that is, those Korean women that white soldiers designated ‘theirs’) could not easily be recognised, there were no clear bodily signifiers (such as skin colour/hair type) that marked her as ‘off limits’ to the black soldiers. In Vietnam, a veteran reports, white soldiers killed ‘white’ prostitutes if they thought they had been with a black soldier.50 Korean prostitutes who worked in brothels that catered to white soldiers learned that they should reject approaches by black soldiers if they wanted to stay in the favour of the white soldiers. Thus much of the disruption in the ‘camptowns,’ that spurred the ‘cleanup’ campaign that is the object of Moon’s analysis seemed to be over fights between black and white soldiers about sexual control of the prostitutes and black soldiers and ‘white’ prostitutes about sexual access to their bodies.51 While the white soldiers were attempting to establish exclusive sexual access to a group of women they deemed ‘theirs,’ the strategy of the black soldiers was to demand equal sexual access so that the prostitutes would be a pool of women available to all US soldiers.

Moon’s work shows that demands for equal sexual access to Korean women in the camptown brothels became an important political issue that the ROK government and USFK officials got involved in. In this case the US military worked to defend the equal sexual rights of black soldiers, while showing no concern at all for the well being of the prostitutes. For example, a USFK military official told Moon it was normal practice for him to speak to brothel owners about individual prostitutes accused of racism and ‘either get her fired or get her head screwed on straight’.52 In other words officials of the USFK co-operated with violent pimps in order to control prostitutes’ behaviour. ROK government officials also attempted to school the prostitutes in how they should behave to the US soldiers, both black and white, as we saw in the example above where the ‘good’ example of how Japanese prostitutes supposedly served US soldiers was brought forward.

That black men’s claim to equality within the US military included the demand for equal sexual access to Korean women, and that the US military commanders agreed to this demand and mobilised their own resources and their influence with the ROK government to regulate the behaviour of prostitutes accordingly is fascinating. Everybody, the soldiers, the military administration and the ROK government, agreed that US soldiers were entitled to the reward of sexually pleasing submissive women, the black soldiers merely insisted that their equal contribution to operations in ROK be equally rewarded in this way. Thus sexual access to the women’s bodies was decided by political relations and struggles among men who agreed that women did not have sexual rights in their own bodies and used their institutional authority to ensure this was the case.

I have found no evidence of prostitutes in Bosnia or Kosovo being divided as belonging to particular groups of peacekeeping soldiers or police, it appears that some women were held specifically for the peacekeepers in common, since some escaped women have reported that all of the men they were sold to were peacekeepers. For example, ‘Monica,’ a Romanian woman who speaks English and French, reports that when she was held prisoner in a brothel in Bosnia the majority of the soldiers she was forced to have sex with were from the US and Germany. She says she always asked them for help and all refused, eventually a local taxi driver helped her to escape in exchange for sex; the peacekeepers obviously did not feel any responsibility to help her and felt free to have sex with her in spite of knowing her prostitution was forced. A thirteen-year-old girl held in a brothel in Kosovo also reported that all of the men brought to her arrived in UN vehicles.53 Thus, although authorities point out that UN
personnel do not provide the majority of clients for prostitutes in these territories, it appears that some foreign prostitutes are held specifically for use by peacekeeping soldiers.

Whatever official and unofficial policies existed toward prostitution when the peacekeepers went in, it seems likely that the spectacle of widespread prostitution among Yugoslav women associated with the international military presence was something administrators would have wanted to avoid. The sexual violence during the Yugoslav wars had received so much attention and was the very kind of atrocity the peacekeepers were supposedly there to prevent, both in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. At the same time relations with the local population, where sexual violence had become intensely politicised, surely must have been seen to depend on zero sexual violence from peacekeepers to local women. While we do not yet have all the information that would allow a full exploration of UN policies and practices with regard to prostitution in Bosnia and Kosovo, a lot can be gleaned from testimonies of escaped women, independent human rights investigators, and the US Congress sub-committee hearings in 2002, as well as from the UN’s own reports. This evidence strongly suggests that forced prostitution of migrant women was tolerated, and even protected, by powerful elements in various command administrations. Furthermore, in Bosnia local police and government officials, who operated under UN direction, seemed to have a lot to do with allowing brothels and the buying and selling of women and girls to continue, while in Kosovo Vanderberg (Human Rights Watch) thinks ‘that this [Kosovo] was a situation absolutely rife for trafficking, [because in Kosovo] the international police are the police’.54

Officially, in both Bosnia and Kosovo the UN proclaimed ‘zero tolerance’ towards ‘trafficking in women’. This is the only policy consistent with UN positions on human rights and on trafficking, however on the ground practice was different. According to UNICEF, members of both local and international police were involved in trafficking as both brothel patrons, and buyers and sellers of women and girls.55 In Kosovo they report suspicion that UNMIK international police officers were involved in the buying and selling of women and girls for prostitution and that some have been sent home for trafficking related offences, this was also reported to the Congress sub-committee.56 Martina Vandenberg of Human Rights Watch told the Congress sub-committee that for Bosnia there was clear evidence of International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitors visiting brothels or having women delivered to their residence, and that at least three IPTF monitors had purchased women and their passports outright.57 The sub-committee also heard that the UN itself reported an American citizen had used a UN vehicle to transport trafficked women from Serbia to Kosovo; that in Bosnia UN vehicles were used to transport trafficked girls58 and that the local police in Bosnia were able to get away with heavy involvement in the sex trade: providing false documents and tip-offs about police brothel raids in exchange for free sexual services.59 A UN STOP (Special Trafficking Operation Program, launched in July 2001, involving teams of international and local police in the case of Bosnia, international police in Kosovo) officer told the BBC that STOP brothel raids never came as a surprise to the bar owners whom elements of the international or local police always tipped off in advance in exchange for free sex. He said that some women had made statements to the police saying that they had been forced by a bar owner to offer sexual favours to his superior and other senior Bosnian officials and that he believed members of French and German SFOR troops were involved in the trade in women and girls, including issuing visas.60

‘Whistle-blower’ Ben Johnston, an aircraft mechanic, gave evidence to the Congress sub-committee that other Americans in Bosnia openly owned and traded girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen as sexual and domestic slaves. After Johnston complained, first to his supervisors and co-workers, then to the CID about other employees’ involvement in trafficking and about their having sex with under-age girls, DynCorp (the US government contractor that provided police and military support personnel for Bosnia) fired him.61 He said that his DynCorp supervisor (John Hirtz) made a videotape of himself raping girls.62 While Hirtz and another man were sent home, the CID ruled that under the Dayton Agreement UN officials and contractors were immune from prosecution. These men also could not be prosecuted in the US, after extensive questioning about various possibilities for prosecuting them David Lamb (a former UN human rights investigator in Bosnia) told the Congress sub-
committee ‘it looks like they got away with it.’

Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney concluded ‘we have got international criminals [that is, ‘owners’ and traders of women and girls] in the employment of the United States government,’ shockingly the House could not find any legal instruments that could be used against these ‘international criminals’ because as international peacekeepers they were immune from prosecution. According to Johnston, other men who keep adolescent girls as ‘slaves’ for sex and to do ‘chores’ were still living in Bosnia and working for DynCorp at the time he testified.

Furthermore, there is ample evidence that strong elements within the UN administration protected the sex trade; this practice can be understood when we consider that the UN must draw on national militaries for peacekeeping military force. Another important factor is that the US contribution was provided by a government contractor, DynCorp, personnel from DynCorp (including police officers and support personnel for the military) were not under military discipline but did enjoy the legal immunity of peacekeepers. The contracts with DynCorp were extremely lucrative, Johnston comments in his testimony that he left the military to work for DynCorp because of the huge difference in the pay levels, Dyncorp personnel did not live on the military base under military discipline but were free to do as they pleased outside of their work time, while enjoying the legal immunity of international peacekeepers. Thus DynCorp personnel operated in an ‘accountability vacuum’, which meant, for example, that, as we saw above, a man could film himself raping a girl and there were no authorities to which he could be held legally accountable.

While in the other cases discussed here (the former military violence in Bosnia and the case of US military bases in ROK) the sexual violence was not especially hidden and fitted the hegemonic nationalist and racist discourses and practices of the forces involved, in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo sexual violence did not sit well within the discursive system of the UN. The UN is a site of competing discourse where feminist discourse has been influential and human rights discourse hegemonic, resulting in such phenomenon as ‘gender’ officers and human rights investigators. Thus this institutional context is fraught with contradictions, and is important for understanding the internal culture of covering-up the involvement of UN personnel in the sex trade and of protecting that trade. Those who did not collude with the culture of cover up did not last long in their jobs it seems. In addition to firing Johnston, DynCorp also fired Kathy Bolkovac, a police officer who joined the gender office in Bosnia in 1999, after she tried to investigate other employee’s involvement in the buying and selling of women, on what the Southampton Employment Tribunal, in August 2002, found were ‘completely unbelievable’ charges of falsifying a time sheet. Former UN Human Rights Investigator in Bosnia, David Lamb, told the Congress Sub-Committee that during his investigations into the involvement of UN personnel in trafficking he and his investigators ‘experienced an astonishing cover-up attempt that seemed to extend to the highest levels of the UN headquarters.’ His investigators got no support from the UN and instead the UN headquarters launched an ‘investigation against the investigators.’ He said his investigators were also threatened by another International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitor that they would be ‘made to pay’ if they did not stop the investigation. He said that other human rights investigators who had reported the involvement of IPTF officers with ‘trafficking and prostitution’ had also been warned off and were afraid to continue because of the harm it could do to their careers. In addition to Lamb’s testimony, Martina Vandenberg of Human Rights Watch reported to the Congress sub-committee that women freed from a brothel by a STOP raid had made statements that the IPTF officers transporting them to give testimony after their release had been brothel patrons and told them not to say ‘too much or anything about our relations.’ Suppression of witness testimony was also uncovered by Lloyd-Roberts, BBC journalist, who reported that two different women she interviewed said that although they had wanted to testify against IPTF officers who had used them while they were entrapped in brothels in Bosnia they had been sent home before they could testify. One told Lloyd-Roberts: ‘I don’t think anyone really cares. They’re covering between each other. They’re in this all together.’

However, the pressure from the publicity generated by the stories of Johnston, Bolkovac and other human rights investigators and media interest in these stories meant that some
measures had to be taken to address what became a public problem. The STOP program, set up in July 2001, carried out bar raids, which ‘freed’ those women willing to go with the officers. One obvious flaw in this scheme is that, as some women have testified, some STOP officers were also brothel patrons. Many women were afraid of the men in uniform, one human rights investigator testified to the Congress sub-committee that the presence of officers in brothels as clients made women afraid to go to the international police for help, and these fears are well founded given reports of police returning women who were trying to escape back to traffickers. In fact owners reportedly used the threat that the police would imprison and/or deport the women as one means of control, and some women have reported being threatened that the police officers would simply rape them and/or sell them elsewhere. Given the behaviour these women have witnessed by international forces it is surprising that any trusted the STOP forces at all. Another problem was that raiding or closing the bars did not stop the sale of women for sex, they were simply held in even more isolated conditions in private rooms and apartments. Most importantly the only assistance that this program offered to these women was to send them to a shelter where they would be helped to return to where they came from. For some women this was no help at all. Many women refused the ‘rescue’ offered by police raids and IOM programs for return. Identifying as ‘trafficked’ to the police required signing a statement requesting return home, the alternative in both Bosnia and Kosovo is a short spell in jail for various charges, usually prostitution or illegal immigration (15-30 days in Bosnia, 20 in Kosovo) and a deportation order that is never implemented. Thus there was no UN support or assistance for the women who did not want to go home; instead they were punished. However it cannot be assumed that the women who did not make a statement to the police requesting return home wanted to work as prostitutes or even if they did that they were happy working as prostitutes for no pay.

Sex worker rights organisations point out that ‘anti-trafficking’ laws and programs most often bolster border controls and make migrating people vulnerable to police harassment while doing little to help women in the sex trade. Rigid border controls and barriers to migration contribute to women becoming trapped in debt bondage since there are no legal channels to migrate and find better paid work and yet, given the lack of paid work opportunities or adequate social security systems in many post-communist countries, of course migration will happen anyway. In such conditions people have no choice but to trust people smugglers – some of who are traffickers, who are able to exploit the economic trap that national borders create. Once trapped, her illegal residency status narrows the sources of help a woman can look for and this makes it much harder for her to get away, her illegal status becomes one of the weapons of control that brothel keepers use.

**Conclusion**

Thus the ‘trafficking’ frame, which the UN used to deal with the problem of sexual violence in the sex industry that grew up around the peacekeeping presence, reveals the political logic that allowed some women to be denied bodily integrity in the peacekeeping context. ‘Anti-trafficking’ policies are based in the logic of borders and focus on the activities of ‘illegal migrants’, at the same time contributing to the continual reproduction of these borders, while having little to do with actually helping the women trapped in the brothels but rather with having a visible program to do something about it. Migrant women were treated by UN officials as people who did not belong, thus such women were either ignored or removed. The evidence further suggests that UN personnel categorised ‘illegal migrant’ women differently than local women in terms of their right to bodily integrity: we consistently find that the brothels which catered to peacekeepers were populated not by local but by ‘illegal’ foreign women, where their ‘illegal’ status became a tool of disempowerment and control. Thus the principles upon which decisions were made about which women would be protected and which would be raped were those of nationalism and national borders: the women who belonged to the nations being ‘protected’ were not subject to organised sexual violence from peacekeepers while migrant women were offered little in the way of effective
protection. If the ‘gender’ and ‘human rights’ apparatus around peacekeeping had any impact at all it was primarily in revealing the strength of resistance to attempts to put a stop to the sexual violence. This resistance makes clear that elements within the military administration considered the right of military personnel to heterosexual encounters, and the consequent organised sexual abuse of women, worth protecting. Moon was correct in her observation about the connection between global political relations and everyday life, in this case we can see that the private tragedy of, for example, a Romanian women in Kosovo being regularly raped by American and German soldiers can only be understood through attention to the political order those soldiers are defending, which clearly does not include the bodily integrity of ‘illegal migrant’ women.

Bibliography


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1 I refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina as ‘Bosnia’ throughout the paper, I use ‘Kosovo’ rather than ‘Kosova’ since it seems the most common in the existing literature.


Daniel McGrory ‘Woman Sacked for Revealing UN Links with Sex Trade’ *Times Online*, August 7, 2002, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-376444,00.html](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-376444,00.html)


6 Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 35.

7 Ibid. 21-24.

8 Ibid. 103. Moon notes that the prostitutes ‘ridiculed’ such schooling, they commented that the nation they were supposed to be working for showed few signs of concern for their well being, nevertheless they also expressed a desire to be protected and accepted by the Korean nation; thus they felt betrayed by the national government (Ibid.152-160).

9 Ibid. 33.

10 Ibid. 84-85.


12 Ibid. 219-220.


15 The military establishment was forced to apologise for this use of the word following an outcry from US gays. Associated Press, who released the photo, apologised, saying it should never have been circulated, and withdrew it. Many disagree however, arguing that the appearance of these words in this context provide a good opportunity to discuss many issues related to war. Verification and background information about the photo can be found at: [http://www.snopes2.com/rumors/bomb.htm](http://www.snopes2.com/rumors/bomb.htm). Typing the
words ‘High Jack this Fags’ into the google search engine will provide you with many different points of view on the photo.

16 Brian Mitchel, *Weak Link*, 190.


24 My discussion here is, for the most part, based on: Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*, which provides scholarly discussion of the impact of sexual violence on subjects based in extensive empirical research.

25 Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 34


28 Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 37

29 Ibid. 37.

30 Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?* 32

31 Ibid. 33-36. See also the testimony of Mr Camile at: Winter Soldier Investigation: Testimony given in Detroit, Michigan on January 31, 1971, February 1 and 2 1971,’ sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. http://lists.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary?Winter_Soldier

32 Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender,’ 67


34 Copelon ‘Surfacing Gender,’ 70-71.

35 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was responsible for providing all civilian police (http://www.umikonline.org/intro.htm), while the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIH) provided a large number of International Police (up to 2047) while also assuming responsibility for recruiting and training local police.
Here I treat the international police as part of the peacekeeping military force.


‘Alina,’’ quoted in *Correspondent: Boys Will be Boys*.

Moon, *Sex Among Allies*, 41-47.

Sue Lloyd-Roberts *Bosnian Police Officer Denounces Corruption*.


Ibid. 26; Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?* 35.


In my view in this exchange the prostitute must always have the right to refuse the client, even for racist reasons; however I realise there is another strong case to be made if we consider sex as just like any other kind of service. I cannot make my case here but I am developing it in another essay.

Moon *Sex Among Allies*, 91.

Both cases are quoted in *Correspondent: Boys Will be Boys*.


UNICEF reports that ‘stories about local and international police being on good terms with owners and traffickers are legion (Limanowska, *Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe*, 24.); that corruption of border police in the transit countries is ‘reportedly commonplace rather than the exception.’ (Ibid. 25); that there is evidence of members of the international police task force ‘directly participating in recruiting, selling, and purchasing false documents.’ (Ibid. 84.)

Ibid. 112; Hearing before the Subcommittee, *The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade*, 49,53.

I treat international police and military support personnel, who work on contract, as part of the military operation.


Ibid. 24.

Sue Lloyd-Roberts *Bosnian Police Officer Denounces Corruption*.


Ibid. 28. That videotape is in the hands of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division according to Kelly Patricia O’Meara, *Insight Magazine*.


Ibid. 49.

Ibid. 27-28.

Ibid. 27.

Ibid. 28.

Kathy Bolkovac had collected statements from women who identified UN personnel as brothel patrons and planned to have these women identify the men using photographs. She described how an American contingent commander had ‘blown the entire investigation’ by warning soldiers of this in advance through the e-mail network, giving men who might be identified time to fabricate an alternative story. She thought that perhaps the men did not understand how the sex trade operated in BOSNIA, and sent an e-mail to all personnel distinguishing ‘trafficking’ from voluntary prostitution. In
response to this her superiors decided she was ‘psychologically burnt out’, without ever consulting her or offering her a psychological assessment, and demoted her. See: Daniel McGrory ‘Woman Sacked for Revealing UN Links with Sex Trade’.

69 Hearing before the Subcommittee, The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade, 32.
70 Ibid. 32.
71 Ibid. 46.
72 Ibid. 47.
73 Ibid. 21.
74 ‘Monica’ quoted in Correspondent: Boys Will be Boys.
75 Hearing before the Subcommittee, The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade, 21.
76 Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, 24-25
77 This is according to Celhia de Lavarène, a journalist appointed by the UN to head a STOP team raid in BOSNIA on which film crews were invited, she made this comment in Correspondent: Boys will be Boys.
78 Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, 81.
79 Ibid. 82,114.
80 Prostitutes Rights, Alleged Trafficking of Asian Sex Workers in Australia. A joint statement of policy drafted by the Prostitutes Rights Organization for Sex Workers; the Sex Workers Outreach Project; Workers in Sex Employment in the ACT; Self-Help for Queensland Workers in the Sex Industry; The Support, Information, Education, Referral Association of Western Australia; The South Australian Sex Industry Network; The Prostitutes Association of South Australia; The Prostitute Association Northern Territory for Health, Education, Referrals; Cybelle, Sex worker Organization Tasmania; Sydney Sexual Health Centre, Sydney Hospital; the Queer and Esoteric Workers Union and representatives of Asian sex working communities in NSW. http://www.bayswan.org/Austraf.html