What I would like to show in this paper is that the modern concept of subjectivity, no matter if it is understood as a philosophical or psychoanalytical subject, is directly connected to the notions of possession and appropriation of the other. In claiming this, I would like to remind you that Descartes’ concept of cogito is based on the belief that one can possess oneself, and thus consequently, that one can possess the other.

I would also like to emphasize the differentiation between the concept of “subject” as empowered by being at the very place of knowledge (understood as ‘rational knowledge’), and the concept of “singular being” - by applying the pronoun “he” when speaking about subject, and, respectively, applying “she” when speaking about singular being. This re-shaping of the traditional map of dichotomies, though seemingly speculative and reproducing the binary structure, has a different content. “He”, the subject, is constituted on the exclusion of “she”, thus “he” stands for the mark of separation, namely of subjectivity. “She”, the singular being, is based on inclusion of “he” and “she” in the sense that “she” is before “he”-excluding-“she”. This does not mean a reversal of the symbolic hierarchy between man and woman; it also does not mean a phantasmatic imposition of an exclusively female homosexual paradise. Woman is here introduced as another name for the multiplicity of sexes that corresponds to the multiplicity of desires, instead of the traditional concept of sexuality based on a desire in which lack is always already inscribed.

For example, Lacan has claimed that the multiplicity of registers that are part of every identity (symbolic, real or imaginary) and place of the subject as place of lack that is – although presented as being within the structure – place of absence, are at the same time subverting and being an necessary cause of constitution of every identity.

**Subjectivity and Sexuality**

Speaking of sexual jealousy in “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality” Freud claims that the “instances of abnormally intense jealousy” that could have been met in his analytic work are constructed of three layers:

- competitive or NORMAL jealousy;
- PROJECTED jealousy;
- Delusional jealousy, or PARANOIA.

There are several moments here that I would like to stress:

- I would like to question the following Freud’s statement – “but the object in these cases is of the same sex as the subject”, used when he is speaking about delusional jealousy, or paranoia. In order to be the subject, the subject has to re-appropriate his sex through the other (sex) as his object. But, thanks to the structure of possession and appropriation of the other (or, in this case, of the object), there is no other, or there is no object in his/hers otherness for the subject. The subject is his own proper object. Or, to
push thought further, the subject’s sex is always already his own proper sex, yet as his object. Can one then conclude that the subject is always already a homo/sexual subject? The ‘one’ sex subject? The ‘same’ sex subject? And furthermore, that the subject is always therefore a male subject? The homo/sexual/male subject? But this is something that feminists have been claiming for a long time. There is nothing radical and new in this discussion and in this conclusion, except, perhaps, a kind of ‘warning’ that one must pay more attention to the concept of ‘homosexuality’ as such. What if homosexuality as such is always already an affair between men? The question that (perhaps) follows is – what about female homosexuality? If homosexuality is always an affair between men – can one conclude that among women there is always a kind of hetero/sexuality? These homo/sexual relations among women are always actually hetero/sexual and thus possibly include a multiplicity of sexes? Is there such a thing as female homo/sexuality?

Unfortunately, because it does not concern my topic directly, I will have to put aside this rather provocative question of the female homo/sexuality and its character, and to stress, for the purposes of this paper, possible hetero or multiple character of thus understood sexuality.

Derrida’s book The Postcard - From Socrates to Freud and Beyond starts with the chapter titled “Envois”. About the word envoy, Derrida writes:

As for the “Envois” themselves, I do not know if their reading is bearable.
You might consider them, if you really wish to, as the remainders of a recently destroyed correspondence. Destroyed by fire,…
…so, that above all the language remains self-evidently secret, as if it were being invented at every step, and as if it were burning immediately, as soon as any third party would set eyes on it (speaking of which, when will you agree that we effectively burn all this ourselves?).

The word “Envois” is also associated with writing in many voices. Derrida from Envois once again: "Too many beds calling everywhere. I'll call you soon". How one can understand what Derrida tries to point out here by using the word Envois, and how can one connect this with the question of sexuality that is posed in this paper?

If sexuality has the structure of a call, - "too many beds calling everywhere. I'll call you soon" - then we are facing another kind of paradox - the circular nature of every call, or, and it amounts to the same thing, the speculative nature of every call. Let me recall here Heidegger’s argumentation: “yes, but there is something even more originary than

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1 Used in this context concept of heterosexuality does not correspond to heteronormativity.
2 envoy, envoyer: envoyer, to send, is derived from the Latin inviare, to send on the way…. The noun envoi can mean the action of sending (envoi de letters: the sending of letters), kickoff (as in the start of football game), something that is sent (especially in the sense of message, missive, or dispatch)…. (From the translator’s glossary).
4 Ibid. p.11.
5 Ibid. p.8.
questioning, than this piety of thinking and it is what he called Zusage which means to acquiesce, to accept, to say “Yes”, to affirm. So this Zusage is not only prior to questioning, but it is supposed by any questioning. To ask a question, you must first tell the other that I am speaking to you. Even to oppose or challenge the other, you must say, “at least I speak to you”, “I say yes to our being in common together.”

This means, that "I" can call "you" only if I am already called, if you called me to call him/her. Therefore, one might argue that there is no such thing as an original call, a naive call. On the contrary, every call is an answer to another call, which means that every question is an answer to another question. This structure of calling and addressing leads us, therefore, to the very core of the paradox of sexuality. For calls call; my call is always multiple. There is no other; there are only others. The figure of the other is the figure of multiplicity. The other always means the third one also. We can call one the other, but we are always called by many different others. Into too many beds. Somehow as a kind of spectacle right in front of our eyes the uncanny truth of sexuality writes itself. There is the other whom we address by a promise - I will call you soon. However, just before the kind of promise that promises the call, there is a kind of information informing the other that the one who is promising to call is actually called, that s/he is already called everywhere, into too many beds. So, there is a little complication, and this complication is related to numbers, to a counting and enumerating, to a kind of accountancy.

This accountancy, as is the case with every accountancy, gives account of depths and properties. Of possessions and appropriations. If I am the one to whom a promise was made and this promise is a promise of being together, and is promising sex, then there is a kind of betrayal of this promise; since the one who is promising is promised already to the others – or - the one who will call me is the one who, at the same time, is answering the calls of the others. Is it always so? Is it always the case that there are very many of us inscribed in a dual relationship? And therefore can I say that this other is my sexual object, which imposes another question - if this sexual object is my property does it mean that the other whom I desire as my sexual object coincidences with my sexual object and is my property, also?

In the previous part of this work, the subject and the whole structure of subject/ivity was “accused”: that is based on the structure of possession, appropriation and thus re-appropriation, and that there is no other for the subject in the sense of being the other that is not always already possessed and appropriated by the subject. Let us explain a little further this claim: subject/ivity has the economic, odyssean structure of returning home, or of returning to the point of departure. At the hurt of the subject is subject itself. The subject is the one who constantly fears being dispossessed; and who, in order to resolve himself being constantly haunted by the same fear, has to have problems in order to protect and project himself. For the subject, sexuality and desire is possible because of its impossibility. This means that the subject has a sadistic structure always searching for another sadist that he himself is. Moreover, the subject is homo/sexual, and consequently all relations between subjects are not only homo/sexual, but more precisely, homosexual affairs among men. Let me remind you one more time, I use this notion of homo/sexuality in the sense that there is a subject whose strategy is the strategy of appropriating the other (in this case, the other sex), in order to re-appropriate himself (and thus, his own sex). What I am trying to point out here is that there is no other sex for the subject in his, or perhaps here it is better to say, in her otherness. There is only, as I previously tried to

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6 See footnote 16.
stress, considering the concept of subjectivity, one proper sex (male) and its other but not as the other’s other. This means, there is no multiplicity and heterogeneity of sexes for the subject. There is only male/homosexual/sex. And finally, consequently, that sexuality and desire understood as being part of this strategy, has something to do with all these attributes that are listed next to the concept of subjectivity.

**Singularity and Sexuality**

On the other side, what is a singular being? Concept of the singular being, used by some French contemporary authors, Jean Luc Nancy being one of them, is the very place of the absence of any strategy: it is neither a product nor a production. A singular being is unique, which means that its uniqueness consists precisely in its multiplicity, or if I can add here, that its uniqueness consists in its heterogeneity and heterosexuality, in the sense that there are always many sexes, multiplicity of sexes included whenever one is speaking about a singular being. A singular being is not a part of anything: neither a part of any relationship, nor of any particular species, nor any kind of order that one could be part of. A singular being means some/one and some other one. Every one is just as singular as any other one. A singular being is not necessarily a human being. Singular beings are endlessly substitutable, each for the other, each for all the others. They are in-different and anonymous. Singular beings are ‘coming and going’. Birth/death are each as the other. What singularises singular beings is their communication with each other in their irreplaceability. Their death, although they do not have access to it (and the same goes for the death of the other/s), is the very place of their irreplaceability.

The singular being cannot appropriate its own sexuality or the sexuality of the other. Nevertheless, the sexuality of one, the same as the sexuality of the other, or the sexuality of the others, is for the singular being being-with-the-others as being-with-everybody. Thus another characteristic of the singular being is that it is always ex-posed: being ex-posed and ex-position ex-posed. Moreover, if a singular being is a being, and nothing more or nothing less, it should have a heart. It should be heart. If it is still possible to talk about something like the essence of (a singular) being, she is something like a heart, although always already a broken heart. Consequently, a singular being should be something capable of love. Or, that is to say, capable of thinking as loving, of a thinking as the affirmation and by her ex-position constant saying yes, yes, ... which is a responding to the call of the other/s. Considering the question of desire, a singular being is constantly trembling in front of the possibility of what might happen to her, who might arrive at her, since it could be anyone, or anything: any other in its otherness, other as person, other as language, other as the world, other as death.

A singular being is a being that is ‘coming and going’ but also a being that is coming as going and going as coming. In that sense, the singular being is the being that is always already on ‘both sides’ of any border, of any limit, and of any end; thus, the singular being is the very place where there are no more borders, no more limits and no more ends. Her ex-position is not anymore a position. In this sense, she is beyond any position, which also means that she is not any position. Precisely because she is never in opposition, she does not have a position and vice versa since she does not assume any position, she does not know any position. In this sense a woman, a singular being, is related to any position in the form of relation without relation. A singular being is pure openness and experience as such. Present in its presence; nothing behind and nothing in front; thus, a singular being is as such an aporia, or to put it differently, she is undecidable crossing of ways. She is constantly open, but since it is impossible to open something that is always already open, she is closed.
I would like to recall here a question of sexual difference, since it was at stake several times in this work. What about sexual difference considering singular beings? I would like to state that in the concept of singularity sexual difference is not inscribed. I would like to recall only a few already mentioned characteristics of a singular being. It is anonymous; it is every/everyone, it is not necessarily human, it is not a part of any order and consequently does not know any differences. Nevertheless, I would say, if one insists on the existence of sexual difference, then the singular being is a woman, but a woman that is not anymore opposed to the man, thus a woman as a ‘hypothetical’ place of subversion of sexual difference. In this sense, one is not talking here about the woman as the one that is opposed to man as his other and thus as a constituted (sexual) difference in the sphere of rationality and knowledge, but rather about a woman whose other is not anymore man but the other’s other. Any/other. Every/other. An anonymous other in its otherness.

And I claim this because I have tried to show that the place of woman is not a place and a position but rather an ex-position. That the woman is the one who is being ‘on both sides’ of any border, and thus is a being capable of the interruption of what is knowable. Consequently, she is by that very gesture of being able to interrupt violently the structure of the knowable, of the reasonable, on the side of what is not knowable without knowing it, as well as on the side of what is knowable although without knowing it. Thus she produces the aporia, or that is to say, she is an aporia herself, as the result of renouncing any structure, any border and any limit, of renouncing any end. But there is again the concept of violence presented in this. Does it mean that the woman or the singular being also ‘fits’ in a kind of sadistic structure?

Perhaps one could say, yes, but she is an/other kind of sadist than the subject/sadist. Here one can perhaps talk about the sadist that is the sadist precisely because of always (possibly) being a masochist. The sadist that is by being ex-posed to its other/ness always possibly a masochist: the sadist that is always trembling in front of the possibility that she might become a masochist whenever she is a sadist: the sadist because her activity can always turn into passivity, or because her activity is always already her passivity; she is never sure if she is a guest or a host, if she is herself or the other in her presence and ex-position, in her coming and going from one to the other. The sadist because of being always the other that is not her other; but the other’s other; every/other. The sadist that cannot appropriate her sadism since she cannot appropriate herself because she is never a position, never an identity but rather an ex-position to the other/ness, in this case possibly to the other/ness of the masochist. But by being ex-posed to the other, one is the other.

Precisely because of her openness, because of her coming and going from one to an/other, and because of her ex-position, one could perhaps talk about the sexuality of a singular being. About sexuality that is based on desire that is, in its uniqueness and in its singularity never completely and fully translated, but rather translatable.

Conclusion

Perhaps a singular being is a thing, perhaps it is an animal, or a plant. Perhaps it is a woman. Perhaps it is a masochist. Perhaps it is a body without organs, as Deleuze says. But not in the sense of having and thus appropriating for the ‘singular being’ another name and thus another identity. Quite the opposite. I believe that in the structure of knowledge, in the structure of language, and thus also in the structure of re-presentation and signification - together with the ‘singular being’, also the woman is not presentable and knowable. Her presence is only on the condition of her absence from the structure of presentation. Hence, as ‘absent being’ she is without possible sex/es, possible name/s, since she is being that is by her ex-position impossible to name, even as singular being.
Then the further question posed here is: how can one think such a being as ‘singular being’? Or, how can one think sexuality and desire of such a being? Again, considering what was said until now about the singular being, it is necessary that there should an absence, an absence of any strategy, not knowledge, not thinking, not presentation, non-language, non-appropriation - in order for there to be any sexuality, any desire, any life, any knowledge and thus any strategy, any thinkability, any presentability, any language, etc. With the aporia, with the aporetic being – everything becomes impossible precisely because of its possibility. Because of the multiplicity of possibilities, and thus because of multiplicity of sexes, sexualities and desires.

In order to be a singular being, one should not have any knowledge of it although it does not mean that such a being does not exist. The unknown that is stressed here is not the border, the limit of what can be known: especially not a negative limit of a knowledge, although it cannot come to us in the form of knowledge and what is knowable. It can touch us. It can arrive at us; it can come to us and go from us. This non-knowledge could, perhaps, be the exposition or hospitality towards the other, towards the other in his/her strangeness; thus it might be sex. It might come as an arrivant, as an absolute one. It might happen to us, in the sense of happenstance. Or it might arrive as ‘coming and going’; its coming is its going, and its going is its coming, from and to the other/ness.

The idea is that there are some types of experience that simply cannot be subject of any knowledge or any theory. At the same time – it's not something anti-theoretical. It means that theory should embrace something theoretically marked as something that is transcending theory.