I work in the area of feminist theory and feminist philosophy of science. My current research project, which I would like to present in Lund, deals with feminism as critique. What kind of critique is the feminist critique of science? In the wake of poststructuralist inspired antifoundationalism feminism has been given the diagnosis of being in a terrible mess with no uncontested, stable concepts to lean on and no innocent positions outside power expressed in a “we” that can explain, legitimate and make necessary a specific political agenda. Feminist theory nevertheless tends to echo Critical Theory in that feminist critique explicitly or implicitly is expected to result in argued and qualified justification for a concrete, emancipatory political practice. Thus even if feminism apparently is in a terrible postdeconstructive mess feminist critique of science still unfolds as dialectical critique – i.e. as critique ultimately exercised from an explicit or implicit standpoint outside science. However, dialectical critique is out of step with the poststructuralist understanding of the relation between knowledge and power; knowledge is always already power. Critique necessarily has to unfold immanent to the very regimes of power/knowledge it seeks to adjudicate. Inside a poststructuralist framework critique thus only makes sense as intervention – i.e. as critique intervening with the object in question aiming at some kind of subversion rather than emancipation. Feminist like Judith Butler and Donna Haraway have presented similar arguments. But is it at all possible for feminist critique to unfold as intervention? Doesn’t feminism presuppose the existence of a standpoint outside science? I will try to explore these questions by bringing in the question of sexual difference as a possible intervening strategy.